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Abstract. We present a novel approach to deal with transitivity permission-
delegation threats that arise in social networks when content is granted
permissions by third-party users thereby breaking the privacy policy
of the content owner. These types of privacy breaches are often unin-
tentional in social networks like Facebook, and hence, (more) in-place
mechanisms are needed to make social network users aware of the con-
sequences of changing their privacy policies. Our approach is unique in
its use of formal methods tools and techniques. It builds on a predicate
logic definition for social networking that caters for common aspects of
existing social networks such as users, social network content, friend-
ship, permissions over content, and content transmission. Our approach
is implemented in Yices. For the predicate logic model, we formulate
a security policy for the verification of the permission flow of content
owned by social network users, and demonstrate how this security policy
can be verified.
Keywords: Event-B, Facebook, Formal Methods, Logic, Non-Interference, Pri-
vacy and Security, Social Networks, Verification, Yices.
1 Introduction
With the advent of the Internet and social media, the ever increasing number
of users of social networking sites, the privacy of social network content people
share has become of utmost importance. In recent years, online social network
services in the form of websites such as Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, and Hi5,
have become popular tools to allow users to publish content, share common
interests and keep up with their friends, family and business connections. Face-
book, currently the dominant service, reports 250 million active user accounts,
roughly half of which include daily activity. Users of social networks often share
private content with multiple groups and people they do not even know in real
life. A typical social network user-profile features personal information (such as
gender, birthday, family situation), a continuous stream of activity from actions
taken on the social network site (such as message sent, status update, games
played) and media content (such as photos and video, and personal comments).
The privacy of this information is a significant concern [GA05], for example,
users may upload media they wish to share with specific friends, but do not
wish to be widely distributed to their network as a whole. Furthermore, the
personal information users post can be used for password breaking or phish-
ing attacks [JJJM07]. Access control to social profiles content is, therefore, an
important issue.
Social network services have conflicting goals. Although respecting the pri-
vacy of their client base is important, they must also grow and expand the
connections between users in order to be successful. This is typically achieved
by exposing content to users through links such as friends-of-friends, in which
content relating to individuals known to a user’s friend (but not the user) is re-
vealed. Examples of this behavior include gaining access to a photo album of an
unknown user simply because a friend is tagged in one of the images. Backdoors
also exist to facilitate casual connections such as allowing an unknown user to
gain access to profile information simply by replying to a message he or she has
sent. APIs are simple to develop and can easily gain access to much of a user’s
profile information. Backdoors have conflicting goals with social networking sites.
A current trend to open APIs to third party developers has exacerbated these
issues [FE08]. Hence, although respecting the privacy policies of social network
sites is important, third-party APIs must also expand connections among users
in order to be successful. This is achieved by allowing users to connect over
common interests by exposing their content through less restrictive policies.
Social-networking sites are constantly evolving and changing by keeping up
with user’s demand for additional functionality. This constant change leaves
users in the dark as to how the social networking site handles their content
and the consequences of their actions. The consequences of user actions refer to
the access privileges granted to other users as a result of those actions. Social
networking sites provide users with the ability to specify their privacy policies
but these are not always effective or are not always applied. The inadequacy of
privacy policies stems from the fact that users find stipulating detailed privacy
settings to be challenging [BAC09]. Additionally, it is not always possible to
trust the social-networking site to uphold user’s policies as became evident from
Facebook privacy breaches in 2009 [Facte], when Facebook changed its privacy
policies without informing its users, resulting in content from private groups,
user-defined friend groups, and user content, being made public. Therefore, the
users require a user-friendly mechanism that informs them of the consequences
of their actions, allowing them to make informed decisions.
Privacy means something different to everyone. Based on the diverse types
of privacy rights and violations, it is evident that technology has a dual role in
privacy: new technologies give rise to new threats to privacy rights, but, at the
same time, they can help to preserve privacy [TW09]. Formal Methods (FM)
provides a mechanism to model the functionality of Social Networking Sites
(SNS) allowing a user to reason about the consequences of their actions in terms
of the set of access privileges granted over some content. This paper presents
a novel approach for modeling and checking social-network privacy policies to
deal with transitivity permission-delegation threats. Our work differs from ex-
isting approaches in its use of FM to deal with the threats. Our work builds on
a predicate logic definition of Social Networks (SN) in Event-B [Abr10]. We use
predicate logic to model SN, SN content, SN users, and privacy policies. The
verification of privacy breaches is entirely performed in Yices, for which we have
written a prelude library for basic Event-B structures like sets and relations,
and we have encoded basic SN operations such as publishing content, uploading
content, commenting on content, deleting content, creating user accounts, and
creating privacy policies, which are crucial for modeling privacy policies. Al-
though the verification of privacy breaches is entirely done in Yices, we decided
to model SNS in logic first as to undertake a sanity check of our understanding
of the model in Rodin [ABH+10], a platform that provides support to Event-B,
and then manually port the predicate logic definition of SNS into Yices.
The contributions of this work are three-fold. (i.) We present a logical frame-
work for checking transitivity permission-delegation threats that arise within a
SNS when access permissions are granted over network content that does not
respect the privacy policy defined over that content. For example, User A (the
Primary User) sets his privacy policy to allow only his friends to see some spe-
cific content. User B, a friend of User A, comment on that content and sets his
personal privacy policy to allow his friends to view the comment. As per the
design of most SNS like Facebook, User B’s action of commenting results in
the comment along with the original content being shared with all his friends.
Therefore, the original content is shared with a set of users that were not stip-
ulated by User A and who are none of his friends, thereby, breaching User A’s
privacy policy. Our work on permission delegation threats originated from the
predicate logic definition for social networking introduced in [CR10], which we
extend here to model privacy policies through an access control mechanism over
lists of users. (ii.) We encode our logical framework for social networking in
the input language of Yices and use Yices’ solver [Dut14] to check for privacy
breaches. We have found Yices to be a performant tool, and its language to
be expressive enough to model all our logical definitions for SNS as well as to
verify transitivity permission-delegation threats. (iii.) We formulate a security
policy for SNS and provide a mechanism for verifying non-interference [GM82]
of the social networking actions performed by a user with respect to the obser-
vations registered by another user. Our security policy addresses the problem of
permission flow of content owned by social network users.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces
Yices and the Event-B formal methodology. Section 3 discusses the different
types of privacy breaches of SNS that we have considered. Section 4 presents our
logical framework for social networking. Section 5 shows how our model for SNS
is encoded in Yices and how the verification of privacy breaches is performed
with the Yices solver. Section 6 complements Section 5 with the addition of
verification conditions for the use of policy instructions. Section 7 presents our
framework for checking non-interference. Section 8 discusses related work and
Section 9 concludes and mentions some future plans.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Yices SMT Solver
Recent breakthroughs in boolean satisfiability (SAT) solving have enabled new
approaches to software verification. SAT solvers can handle problems with mil-
lions of clauses and variables that are encountered in varied domains. Satisfi-
ability modulo theories (SMT) generalize SAT by adding a number of useful
first-order theories such as those related to equality reasoning and arithmetic.
An SMT solver is a tool for deciding the satisfiability of formulas in these the-
ories. SMT solvers enable application of bounded model checking to infinite
systems. Yices [Dut14] is an SMT solver developed by SRI that decides the sat-
isfiability of arbitrary formulas containing uninterrupted function symbols with
equality, linear real and integer arithmetic, scalar types, recursive data types, tu-
ples, records, extensional arrays, fixed-size bit-vectors, quantifiers, and lambda
expressions. The SAT solving algorithm used in Yices is a modern variant of
Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL). SMT-LIB Benchmarks and Yices
together are used as the theorem prover for our proof verifier. We have use Yices
to encode our definition of Social Networking Sites (SNS) that was originally
presented in [CR10]. This
The Yices tool is an SMT solver developed at SRI International. It provides
support for checking satisfiability of formulae containing uninterpreted function
symbols with equality, linear real and integer arithmetic, bit-vectors, arrays,
recursive data-types, universal and existential quantifiers, lambda expressions,
tuples, and records. Hence, given a model in Yices, the solver returns “sat”,
“unsat”, or “unknown” when some analyzed formula or model is satisfiable,
unsatisfiable, or when it cannot decide, respectively.
The example below introduces a function foo in Yices. The symbol :: intro-
duces a type definition, so foo is a lambda function that takes an integer element
y and returns its successor. Variable x is declared and equalized to function foo
applied to 1. The check instruction checks whether a valuation for x exists that
equals foo evaluated in 1. The Yices model is therefore satisfiable (by taking x
equals to 2).
(define foo :: (-> int int))
(assert (= foo (lambda (y::int) (+ y 1))))
(define x :: int)
(assert (= (foo 1) x))
(check)
2.2 Event-B
Event-B is a formal modeling language for reactive systems that allows the mod-
eling of software and hardware systems [Abr10] altogether. It is based on Action
Systems [BS91], a formalism describing the behavior of a system by the atomic
actions that the system carries out. An Action System describes the state space
of a system and the possible actions that can be executed in it. Event-B models
are composed of contexts andmachines. Contexts define constants, uninterpreted
sets and their properties expressed as axioms, while machines define variables
and their properties, and state transitions expressed as events. An event is com-
posed of a guard and an action. The guard (written between keywords where
and then) represents conditions that must hold in a state for the event to trig-
ger. The action (written between keywords then and end) computes new values
for state variables, thus performing an observable state transition.
In Event-B, systems are typically modeled via a sequence of refinements.
First, an abstract machine is developed and verified to satisfy whatever correct-
ness and safety properties are desired. Refinement machines are used to add
more detail to the abstract machine until the model is sufficiently concrete for
hand or automated translation to code.
context snctx
sets
PERSON CONTENTS
end
machine snEvB sees snctx
variables persons contents owner pages
invariants
@inv1 persons ⊆ PERSON
@inv2 contents ⊆ CONTENTS
@inv3 owner ∈ contents ։ persons
@inv4 pages ∈ contents ↔ persons
events
event initialisation
then
@action1 persons := 
@action2 contents := 
@action3 owner := 
@action4 pages := 
end
event upload
any c pe
where
@guard1 c ∈ CONTENTS \ contents
@guard2 pe ∈ persons
then
@action1 contents := contents ∪ {c}
@action2 owner(c) := pe
@action3 pages := pages ∪ {c 7→ pe}
end
event hide
any c pe
where
@guard1 c ∈ contents
@guard2 pe ∈ persons
@guard3 c 7→ pe ∈ pages
@guard4 owner(c) , pe
then
@action1 pages := pages \ {c 7→ pe}
end
end
Fig. 1. Logical model for social networking
Figure 1 presents a simplified version of an Event-B model for SNS further
explored in Section 4. The initialisation event starting gives initial values to the
state (machine) variables. Two further events are shown: one that is triggered
when any user uploads a new content item (the upload event), and the other
triggered when a content item is to be hidden from some user page (the hide
event). The upload event uploads a content item c to the account of person pe.
c is a fresh content item since c < contents. The hide event hides content item c
from the page of person pe1.
The syntax:
any x where G(s, c, v, x) then v := A(s, c, v, x) end
specifies a non-deterministic event that can be triggered in a state where the
guard G(s, c, v, x) holds for some bounded value x, sets s, constants c, and ma-
chine variables v. When the event is triggered, a value for x satisfying G(s, c, v, x)
is non-deterministically chosen and the event action v := A(s, c, v, x) is executed
with x bound to that value. The correctness condition of the event requires that,
for any x chosen, the new values of the state variables computed by the action
of the event maintain the invariant properties of the machine. The semantics of
events thus models a system that is controlled by interactions with the environ-
ment (i.e. user actions) that may occur at any time.
Our model for social networking is ported to Rodin [ABH+10]. Rodin is an
open-source Eclipse IDE for Event-B that provides a set of tools for working
with Event-B models: an editor, a proof generator, and several provers. Rodin
provides an API for the data model and persistence layer that allows plug-ins to
work with Event-B components. The example in Figure 1 uses the Rodin tool
notation, where predicates on different lines are implicitly conjoined and actions
on different lines are executed simultaneously. The “\” symbol is used for set
difference.
3 Privacy Policy Definition
In the context of Social Networking Sites (SNS), from a user’s perspective, a
privacy policy is a statement that discloses some or all of the ways a system
shares and manages the user’s data. Personal information can be anything that
can be used to identify an individual, not limited to but including name, address,
date of birth, marital status, contact information or any content shared by a user
within a SNS. From the perspective of the SNS system, a privacy policy is a
statement that declares a policy on how it collects, stores, and releases personal
information. It tells the user what specific information is collected from him, and
whether it is kept confidential or shared with partners and, if so, how.
More specifically, in the context of a SNS, privacy policies are defined on a
per-user basis. A user’s privacy policy defines a set of other users within the SNS,
which can be granted view or edit privileges over some content. With the concept
of user-defined lists proper of SNS such Facebook, a user can specify which list
of users they wish to share said content with and which set of users must never
be granted any privileges over the content. A user might have multiple different
policies regarding content sharing, for instance, friends or acquaintances. This
is due to the flexibility required within SNS when it comes to content sharing.
1 Events upload and hide are further refined to see the adding and removing of per-
missions (who can see or modify what?) over content c.
A look at trends in current SNS shows that a user can either use a pre-defined
policy or define a new one, every time they want to share some content. For
example, in Facebook, a user may add some content to the SNS and then can
wish to share it. When sharing, the user’s default policy is set to the policy
last defined by the user, the user then either selects this policy or define a new
policy on-the-fly. A new privacy policy, the policy to be checked for compliance,
can thereby be defined as the consequences of any actions performed by a user
within the SNS. More specifically, a policy is defined by the set of users granted
privileges over some specific content.
3.1 A Policy Definition Example
Let us assume, a user has defined a privacy policy which states that when their
content is shared, it must only be shared with the users in the user-defined list
close-friends. To this effect the user defines an OriginalPolicy policy as
shown below. In this policy, a user ow1 (called the content owner) is created
with some required page content c1. User ow1 refers to the user in question
who is defining their policy. Next, the policy creates list close-friends before
transmitting c1 to the members of the list.
OriginalPolicy(){
create-account(ow1, c1);
create-list(close-friends, ow1);
transmit-to-list(c1, close-friends);
}
Now, another user defines CommentPolicy wherein when they comment on
some content it must be shared with the user-defined list work. The comment
they are sharing is linked to the existing content c1. To this effect, the policy is
defined as shown below. The CommentPolicy reflects the mechanisms adopted
by SNS such as Facebook for commenting on content. In this policy, user ow2
is created with some required page content c2, and ow2 refers to the user in
question who is defining their policy. Next, the policy (the user ow2) creates list
work before commenting on c1. The effect of commenting is as follows (the two
commented lines in CommentPolicy):
– The users in list work are granted view permission (privilege) over content
c1. This is implemented via the first transmit-to-list operation.
– The comment cmt is also transmitted to the users in list work.
CommentPolicy(){
create-account(ow2, c2);
create-list(work, ow2);
comment(c1, cmt, work);
// transmit-to-list(c1, work);
// transmit-to-list(cmt, work);
}
Transitivity permission-delegation arises when third-party users are given
permissions on content either inadvertently or in any case unwanted. The typical
example is when I give a friend (access) permission on some of my photos and
he or she comments on that photo, after which some of the my friend’s friends
will have access to my photos too. In our example, to identify if a transitivity
permission-delegation will cause a privacy breach, we check if CommentPolicy
complies with OriginalPolicy. We need to ascertain the relationship between
ow1’s list close-friends and ow2’s list work. This relationship can manually
be provided by the user or can be determined automatically from the SNS. This
relationship is a subset relationship. We check whether the list of people given
view permission on c1 by CommentPolicy is a subset of the list of people given
view permission on c1 by OriginalPolicy. This amounts to checking whether
list work is a subset of list close-friends. As this is not the case, the user is
informed that a privacy breach exists, and they can decide to take an appropriate
action to mitigate the breach or not.
Our policies are presented in a simplified manner for better understanding.
Policies ought to include instructions to create content items and social network
users. As we will see in Section 5.2 operations within a policy definition are
state transformers, that is, they are parametrized by the pre- and poststate of
the system. We ensure that the conditions required by the various operations
are met by checking the operation preconditions, and by checking the system
invariants. Only once the individual policies are deemed correct are they checked
for compliance. The following are some of the features of our policy checking
mechanism:
(a) Privacy policies can be compared. This confers a great level of flexibility as
a new-defined policy can be checked for compatibility with respect to an
old-defined policy.
(b) Privacy policies can be checked for adherence to safety (invariant) properties
of the SNS. This will be discussed in Section 3.2.
3.2 Policy Compliance
Our aim is to provide a mechanism for users to compare policies to check for their
compliance, that is, whether a policy attests to another or not. The functionality
of SNS like Facebook is often extended via the implementation of third-party
plugins, which are typically granted access to user’s content available throughout
the SNS. On the other hand, users often change their privacy policies due to an
increasing concern on the security of the data they post on the network. Based
on the above there exist four major kinds of privacy breaches that a user might
need to compare privacy policies for compliance to avoid:
1. SNS Privacy Breach: As a SNS evolve, its internal mechanism might change.
These changes might affect how and to whom content is transmitted and the
way policies are defined, thereby leaving users exposed to privacy breaches.
Let us take a real-world example of Privacy Breach that occurred when
Facebook updated the format of their privacy policies [Facte]. The policy
updates granted users with more control over their content, but it reset all
previously defined policies to their default value, that is, public. Our approach
can detect this type of breach by checking the new policy against the safety
policy defined for the SNS. The old policy stipulates that a user ow can
publish content to a list called friends. The new policy stipulates that the
same user ow can publish to a list public that is not a subset of friends.
The two policies below show the situation of the breach. OldPolicy is the
policy before the update and NewPolicy is the policy after the update.
OriginalPolicy(){
create-account(ow, rc);
upload(rc, ow);
create-list(friends, ow);
transmit-to-list(rc, friends);
}
NewPolicy(){
create-account(ow, rc);
upload(rc, ow)
create-list(public, ow);
transmit-to-list(rc, public);
}
2. User Privacy Breach: Wherein a user inadvertently breaches their own pri-
vacy by not realizing that consequences of their own actions due to a lack
of understanding of the internal working of the SNS. The internal working
of a SNS is typically expressed as a safety policy, which refers to invariant
properties of the SNS. For instance, a safety invariant policy could express
that users can only edit content they can (at least) see.
Let us assume, a user has created three lists within the SNS regarding the
users they work with. A list of colleagues that contains users that they work
with, which have the same hierarchical level (peers) within the organization,
a list of superiors that contains users who are higher than the user in the
organizational hierarchy (bosses), and a list of employees, which is made up
of all the users in the organization.
The user has defined an OldPolicy policy that states that when they share
some content it must only be shared with the users in the list colleagues.
In this policy a user ow is created with some required content rc. User ow
is the user in question who is defining their policy. Next, the policy adds
some content to the SNS via the upload operation, allocating content own-
ership to ow. Then, the policy creates a list colleagues before transmitting
content to the users in that list. Now, the user in question defines a New-
Policy, wherein when they share some content it must be shared with the
list of employees but hidden from the list superiors. This policy might
be the policy defined by the user the next time they share some content
or the policy adopted by an external plug-in being used by the user. In
the NewPolicy policy, first a user ow is created with some required con-
tent rc. User ow refers to the user in question who is defining their pol-
icy. Next, the policy adds some content to the SNS via the upload oper-
ation, allocating content ownership to ow. Then, the policy creates a lists
employees and superiors before transmitting content to the users. Op-
eration transmit-to-list-restricted sends content to users in the first
list who are not in the second list (see Section 4.1).
OldPolicy(){
create-account(ow, rc);
upload(content, ow);
create-list(colleagues, ow);
transmit-to-list(content, colleagues);
}
NewPolicy(){
create-account(ow, rc);
upload(content, ow)
create-list(employees, ow);
create-list(superiors, ow);
transmit-to-list-restricted(content,
employees, superiors);
}
Let us assume that the SNS imposes a safety property stipulating that the
list of employees is the union of the two list colleagues and superiors.
As the set of access permissions allocated after the execution of NewPolicy
is the same as subset of the set of access permissions granted by OldPolicy,
our checking mechanism is able to inform that NewPolicy complies with
OldPolicy.
3. User to User Privacy Breach: Wherein a user might unintentionally breach
another user’s privacy policy due either sharing that user’s content or due
to the automated transmission policy adopted by the SNS, for example, a
comment on content can make it visible to an unintended audience. This
case is explained by the example presented in Section 3.1.
4. Application Privacy Breach: A user might use an external plug-in developed
by a third-party developer which might not adhere to either the user’s privacy
policy or the policy enforced by the SNS.
Let us assume, a user has defined an OldPolicy as below, which states that
when they share some content, it must only be shared with the users in the
list close-friends. Next, the user uses an external (third-party) plug-in to
edit content that has been previously uploaded (to the SNS) and shared. The
third-party plug-in implements a NewPolicy policy as below. Edited content
c is deleted by user ow and then replaced by new content.
Since the same list close-friends is used in both policies, no privacy policy
breach is produced.
OldPolicy(){
create-account(ow, rc);
upload(content, ow);
create-list(close-friends, ow);
transmit-to-list(content,
close-friends);
}
NewPolicy(){
create-account(ow, rc);
upload(content, ow)
create-list(close-friends, ow);
transmit-to-list(content,
close-friends);
edit(content, ow, new-content);
}
There is at present no system in place within SNS (Facebook or others) that
empowers users with the ability to compare the consequences of their actions
with those of a pre-existing privacy policy. In addition to this shortcoming, policy
enforcement is only employed when sharing some content explicitly. The privacy
issue raised by such a selective policy enforcement is, there exist other actions a
user might perform which alters the set of users the said content is visible to. For
instance, on Facebook, a user might tag some content thereby making it visible
to all the friends of the tagged user or a comment on some content by a user
might make the content visible to the user’s friends. Therefore, there is a need
for policy comparison and compliance every time a user performs an action that
might alter the set of privileges over the content in question.
Any action or operation performed by a user, either directly within a SNS or
via an external plug-in, can be considered as the definition of a new transmission
privacy policy. For instance, if a user were to upload some content item rc and
share it with a list of users, ListA, the policy defined would state that only the
users in ListA should have view privileges and only the owner of rc must have
edit privileges. Next, if a user comments on rc, the new policy would specify
a list of users, ListB, who now have view privileges over the comment and the
original content. It is necessary to check that the list ListB is a subset of ListA.
If this is not true the action of commenting would breach the original privacy
policy specified.
Checking compliance of a new policy with respect to an old policy is per-
formed in Yices. In addition to checking compliance, we also check that oper-
ations within the policies are executable, that is, operations are called at ap-
propriate program states. This second checking generates a series of verification
conditions as described in the beginning of Section 6. The conjunction of both
checkings is encoded and verified in Yices as discussed in Section 6.1.
4 The Logical Model for Social Networking
The checking of privacy breaches of SNS is entirely carried out in Yices. Nev-
ertheless, there are a few good reasons for us having modeled SNS in predicate
logic first and then manually ported the model into Yices. First, one can (and
should) use Rodin and all of its (semi-) automatic provers to demonstrate that
the logical model for SNS is consistent, and that, consequently, SN operations do
not invalidate safety invariant properties. Safety invariant properties would be
difficult to encode or at least to check in Yices directly. Here are two examples
of invariant properties. (i.) “the owner of some data has all the permissions on
it” (ii.) “users that can edit data must also be able to view it”. For the former
property, notice that owner is a total function from network content to the set
of persons of the social network, and hence Rodin generates Proof Obligations
(POs) for any operation manipulating (adding or removing) content to ensure
that owner remains a total function. These POs are discharged once and for-
ever in Rodin. Carrying out the same type of verification in Yices would highly
decrease the performance of any operation about the ownership of content, and
hence the performance of our checking for privacy breaches. The former property
can succinctly be expressed as editp ⊆ viewp, and checking it in Yices would also
negatively affect performance.
Our Event-B model for SNS encompasses the concept of privacy. Privacy is-
sues have generated a bunch of theories and approaches, nonetheless, as stated
by Anita L. Allen in [All88], “while no universally accepted definition of privacy
exists, definitions in which the concept of access plays a central role have be-
come increasingly commonplace”. Following Allen’s approach, our logical model
of SNS encodes privacy with the aid of relations that register users’ access privi-
leges (view and edit permissions) on social-network content along with a content
ownership relation (who owns what?).
Our model comprises six Event-B components (called machines): an abstract
machine and five refinements. Table 1 shows what each machine observes. A first
abstract model views the system as composed of users and content, representing
photos, videos, or text that a person has on his personal page. Three notions
concerning these are modeled at this level: contents and social network users,
contents in each user page and content ownership. The pages relation associates
each person with the content items in the user’s page. It is thus a many-to-many
relation, written contents↔ persons. The owner relation keeps track of what
contents belong to whom. The owner owner(c) of a content item c is unique and
every user in the network must own at least one content. owner is thus modeled
as a total surjective function: owner ∈ contents։ persons. All contents belonging
to a user must reside on that user’s page. This is modeled by the invariant owner
⊆ pages. Basic operations (events) at this level provide functionality for creating
and deleting accounts, uploading content into a user’s page, deleting (owned)
or hiding (not owned) contents from a page, transmitting a content to selected
users and editing/commenting contents.
The first machine refinement models access privileges. They are of two kinds,
view and edit, each modeled in a separate relation: viewp ∈ contents ↔ persons
and editp ∈ contents↔ persons. These relations implement sets of content-person
pairs. A pair (c,p) (written c 7→ p in Event-B) in relation view states that person
p has view privileges over content c, and similarly for relation edit.
Table 1. Architecture of SNS in Event-B
Machine Observations
Abstraction Page content, content visibility, content ownership
Refinement 1 View and edit access permissions
Refinement 2 Principal content, page fields
Refinement 3 Mandatory content
Refinement 4 User wall, wall visible content, wall access privileges
Refinement 5 User lists, visibility and privileges
The following invariant properties of the abstract model state that, (i.) owner(c)
has all privileges over content item c, (ii.) a privilege to edit a content item im-
plies the user is allowed to see it and (iii.) a user is allowed to view all contents
in his page.
owner ⊆ viewp
owner ⊆ editp
editp ⊆ viewp
pages ⊆ viewp
Our model defines operations for creating, transmitting, making visible, hid-
ing, editing, commenting, removing and granting privileges over a raw content.
All these operations, of course, are defined so as to maintain all the invariant
properties. A user not owning a content can only remove it from his page. As a
side effect, that user’s permissions over the content are also deleted. Event delete
in Table 2 (i.) shows the operation for removing content in a SNS. Content item
c along with the list of contents cts (the parameters of the event) are removed
from the SNS. The first event guard states that c is an existing content item. The
second guard says that c is not the only content item that is owned by owner(c).
The range restriction relation expression r ⊲ s restricts the range of relation r to
consider only elements in a subset s of its range. The third guard says that cts
is a list of content items, and the last guard says that c is not in cts. The first
action modifies contents to include c along with cts. The domain subtraction
relation operation r ⊳− s returns a relation calculated from r after disregarding all
the elements of its domain that are in the set s. The second and third actions
remove {c} ∪ cts from the domain of owner and pages, respectively. The last two
actions remove all the existing permissions on the removed content.
Notice that content items are removed from all pages, and not only from the
page of owner(c). Similarly, all privileges over the content are deleted. Similarly,
all comments over the deleted content are removed. This is not shown here. This
happens in a further machine refinement. Our model for SNS also includes an
event make-visible that works in the opposite way as event hide, and comment for
commenting network content. Section 7 shows a full definition of both events.
Table 2. Removing and publishing content
i.) Removing content ii.) Publishing content
event delete 
any c cts
where
@guard1 c ∈ contents
@guard2 {c} ⊂ dom(owner⊲{owner(c)})
@guard3 cts ⊆ contents
@guard4 c < cts
then
@action1 contents := contents \ ({c} ∪ cts)
@action2 owner := ({c} ∪ cts) ⊳− owner
@action3 pages := ({c} ∪ cts) ⊳− pages
@action4 viewp := ({c} ∪ cts) ⊳− viewp
@action5 editp := ({c} ∪ cts) ⊳− editp
end
event transmit 
any c prs
where
@guard1 c ∈ contents
@guard2 prs ⊆ persons
@guard3 owner(c) < prs
then
@action1 pages := pages ∪ ({c} × prs)
@action2 viewp := viewp ∪ ({c} × prs)
end
4.1 Publishing Content
The fifth refinement deals with user lists and transmission policies. Lists control
the destination of published content. A list is composed of social network users
(listpe ∈ LISTS ↔ persons). A user owning a list (listow ∈ LISTS 7→ persons) can
publish content to all or selected members of the list. Privacy policies are rela-
tions among lists. A particular policy is a set of list pairs (policies ∈ dom(listow)
↔ dom(listow)) that establishes some constraints over publication of contents to
members of lists in the first element of each pair with respect to members in
the second elements of pairs. A disjointness policy, for instance, may constrain
destinations of contents by sending it to each member of the list in some first
element of the pair, provided it does not also belong to the list in the second
element. A policy cannot constrain a list with itself: dom(listow) ⊳ id ∩ policies
= .
A common operation to social-networking websites is publishing content to
people in the network. The basic content transmission event is shown in Table 2
(ii.) whereby the owner of content c transmits it to some unspecified set of users
prs. Transmission grants view permission to recipients.
Publishing can also be performed by sending contents to a list of users rather
than to a single user. The two events for sending to lists of users are shown
in Table 3, each extends event transmit. Actions and guards of an extended
event are (implicitly) copied into the actions and guards of the extending event,
respectively. The difference between the two aforesaid events amounts to the
way prs, the recipients, are instantiated: in (i.) prs is all the members of the list,
whereas in (ii.) prs is restricted to members of list l1 that do not belong to list
l2.
Table 3. Publishing content over lists
i.) Publishing content to an unrestricted list ii.) Publishing content to a restricted list
event transmit-to-list
extends transmit 
any l
where
@guard1 l ∈ dom(listow)
@guard2 listpe[{l}] = prs
@guard3 owner(c) = listow(l)
end
event transmit-to-list-restricted
extends transmit 
any l1 l2
where
@guard1 l1 ∈ dom(listow)
@guard2 l2 ∈ dom(listow)
@guard3 l1 , l2
@guard4 owner(c) = listow(l1)
@guard5 owner(c) = listow(l2)
@guard6 prs = listpe[{l1}] \ listpe[{l2}]
end
Our Event-B model includes other SNS operations (not shown here) such
as create-account for setting up a new account, upload for populating a user’s
account with new content, edit-owned and edit-not-owned for editing existing
user content, comment for commenting on content, and various operations on
the wall, a common concept in SNS.
5 The Yices Model for Social Networking
We have encoded Event-B’s primary data structures in Yices, as well as the SN
operations presented in Section 4. In what follows we discuss our implementation
of sets (of integers) and relations (over integers) in Yices, then, we discuss the
encoding of SN operations.
Table 4. Basic Event-B mathematical notation
Syntax Name Definition Short Form
q; r forward {(x, z) | ∃y · (x, y) ∈ q ∧ q; r
composition (y, z) ∈ r}
id(s) identity relation {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ s × s ∧ id(s)
x = y}
s ⊳ r domain restriction {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ r ∧ x ∈ s} id(s); r
s ⊳− r domain subtraction {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ r ∧ x < s} (dom(r)\s) ⊳ r
r ⊲ s range restriction {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ r ∧ y ∈ s} id(s); r
r ⊲− s range subtraction {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ r ∧ y < s} r ⊲ (ran(r)\s)
r[s] relational image {y | (x, y) ∈ r ∧ x ∈ s} ran(s ⊳ r)
r ⊕ q relation {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ q ∨ q ∪ (dom(q) ⊳− r)
overriding ( (x, y) ∈ r ∧
 z · (x, z) ∈ q )}
r∼ inverse relation {(x, y) | (y, x) ∈ r} r∼
5.1 Sets and Relations
Sets and relations are at the core of Event-B hence their encoding in Yices
must be efficient so as to render verification practical. Table 4 shows some of
the Event-B’s sets and relations operations that we have implemented in Yices.
We encode sets and relations as bit-vectors, which are native types in Yices. A
set of integers is encoded by the type bset, defined as a bit-vector of size 8.
The elements of the set are those positions with a bit equals to 1. Sets hold up
to 8 elements from 0 to 7. We haven’t implemented any operation recursively.
First, Yices 2.5.2 offers poor support to recursion, and second, our definitions
for sets and relations are bitwise rather than algebraic, so we have found bitwise
manipulation of sets and relations to be simpler and faster than their recursive
manipulation.
(define-type bset (bitvector 8))
Function bset-singleton builds a singleton set from an integer by using
the bv-shift-left bitwise operator of Yices, thus bset-7 is built by shifting
bset-0 7 times to the left. Function bset-is-subset builds on the bv-and bit-
vector operator to return true when s1 is a subset of s2. We have implemented
in Yices all the standard set operations including unioning, intersecting, and
checking membership.
(define bset-empty::(bitvector 8) (mk-bv 8 0))
(define bset-0::(bitvector 8) (mk-bv 8 1))
(define bset-1::(bitvector 8) (bv-shift-left0 bset-0 1))
...
(define bset-7::(bitvector 8) (bv-shift-left0 bset-0 7))
(define bset-singleton::(-> int bset)
(lambda(j::int)
(if (= j 0) bset-0
(if (= j 1) bset-1
(if (= j 2) bset-2
(if (= j 3) bset-3
(if (= j 4) bset-4
(if (= j 5) bset-5
(if (= j 6) bset-6
(if (= j 7) bset-7 bset-empty))))))))))
(define bset-is-subset::(-> bset bset bool)
(lambda(s1::bset s2::bset)
(= s1 (bv-and s1 s2)) ) )
A relation is encoded by the type brel and defined as a bit-vector of size 64.
Our experience using Yices version 5.2.2 shows that selected size for sets and
relations are big enough to verify Yices models of SNS. Relations in Event-B are
encoded as a set of pairs. You can think of an object of type brel as composed
of 8 objects of type bset. Each bit set to 1 in each of those objects represents an
element in the range of the relation. Function brel-get-range expresses that
formally. It returns the range of a relation. It extracts the 8 aforesaid objects of
a relation and unions them.
Function brel-ran-restriction implements the range-restriction of a re-
lation r with respect to a set s (see Table 4 for a formal definition of range-
restriction). It extracts the 8 objects of r, then uses the bv-and bit-vector op-
erator to intersect each with s (to restrict the range of the relation to s), and
finally uses the bv-concat bit-vector operator to form the returned relation from
each intersected object.
We have implemented all the standard Event-B relation operators in Yices,
including domain-restriction, domain subtraction, range-subtraction, inverse of
a relation, etc. However, notice that, as in the case of brel-ran-restriction,
Yices implementations do not exactly follow the formal definitions in Table 4.
It would be impractical as definitions in the table are algebraic and our imple-
mentation uses bit-vectors instead.
(define-type brel (bitvector 64))
(define brel-get-range::(-> brel bset)
(lambda(r::brel)
(bset-union (bv-extract 7 0 r)
(bset-union (bv-extract 15 8 r)
(bset-union (bv-extract 23 16 r)
(bset-union (bv-extract 31 24 r)
(bset-union (bv-extract 39 32 r)
(bset-union (bv-extract 47 40 r)
(bset-union (bv-extract 55 48 r)
(bv-extract 63 56 r) )))))))))
(define brel-ran-restriction::(-> brel bset brel)
(lambda(r::brel s::bset)
(bv-concat (bv-concat (bv-concat (bv-and (bv-extract 7 0 r) s)
(bv-and (bv-extract 15 8 r) s) )
(bv-concat (bv-and (bv-extract 23 16 r) s)
(bv-and (bv-extract 31 24 r) s) ))
(bv-concat (bv-concat (bv-and (bv-extract 39 32 r) s)
(bv-and (bv-extract 47 40 r) s) )
(bv-concat (bv-and (bv-extract 55 48 r) s)
(bv-and (bv-extract 63 56 r) s) )) )))
5.2 Operations
Each SN operation (event) is implemented in Yices with the aid of two func-
tions, the first function captures the semantics of the event precondition, and the
second one the semantics of the event implementation. In Event-B, events are
implemented through event actions that are composed of multiple assignments,
and event guards play the role of the event precondition. Assignments have two
parts, its left-hand side is a state variable, and its right-hand side is an expression
of machine (state) variables and fresh variables introduced by the event. Events
do not have an explicit notation for a variable postcondition, nevertheless, the
use of a variable on the right hand-side of an assignment denotes the value of
the variable in the pre-state of the event, and its use on the left hand-side of an
assignment denotes its value in the poststate of the execution of the event.
The precondition function returns a boolean value (the precondition itself),
and the second function is implemented as a state transformer in Yices, that is,
it takes the event prestate and returns its poststate as the result of executing
the events. States are implemented as tuples with an entry for each machine
variable.
;;; persons contents owner pages viewp editp
;;; listpe listow policies disjointness
(define-type state (tuple bset bset brel brel brel brel brel brel brel brel))
Predicate transmit-to-list-precondition implements the guard of transmit-
to-list in Table 3. Notice that operation transmit-to-list extends operation trans-
mit (see Table 2), so transmit-to-list-precondition actually implements the
conjunction of the guards of both operations. An expression such as (pages s)
returns the machine variable pages, where s is the event prestate, (policies
s) returns the privacy policies, etc.
(define transmit-to-list-precondition :: (-> state int bset int bool)
(lambda(s::state c::int prs::bset l::int)
(and (bset-is-member (contents s) c)
(bset-is-subset prs (persons s))
(not (bset-is-subset (brel-apply (owner s) c) prs))
(bset-is-member (brel-get-domain (listow s)) l)
(bset-is-equal (brel-apply (listpe s) l) prs)
(bset-is-equal (brel-apply (owner s) c) (brel-apply (listow s) l)))))
Function transmit-to-listmakes some content available to a list of users.
Each person in prs is given view permission on the transmitted content c, which
is also added to their pages. The function returns the state after modifying the
page contents and the view permission on the new content. Notice that according
to the transmit-to-list-precondition the lists prs and lst are the same.
(define transmit-to-list :: (-> state int bset int state)
(lambda(s::state c::int prs::bset l::int)
(mk-tuple
(persons s)
(contents s)
(owner s)
(brel-union (pages s) (brel-product-singleton-set c prs))
(brel-union (viewp s) (brel-product-singleton-set c prs))
(editp s)
(listpe s)
(listow s)
(policies s)
(disjointness s) )))
6 The Verification Condition Generator (VCGen)
Each use of an instruction within a privacy policy generates a verification con-
dition (VC) that attests against the executability of that instruction. If the
instruction is an operation, then the VC builds on the operation precondition,
and hence the operation can only be executed if the VC can be discharged in
Yices. For instance, it is possible to execute the transmit-to-list operation of
NewPolicy in Section 3.2 only if the operation precondition holds.
We have encoded a verification condition generator (VCGen) in Yices for
discharging VCs. The VCGen generates a verification condition VCi for each
instruction Si. VCi takes the form shown below, where pi is the pre-condition
of Si and qi is its post-condition. The consolidated VC is the conjunction of
each VCi, which is passed to Yices’ SMT solver to check for satisfiability. Each
VCi not only relates to the respective instruction Si but also to VCi+1. The
Expression Si-precondition is the precondition of operation Si. Events do not
have an explicit notion for event postcondition, so expression Si-postcondition
rather modifies the current state according to the event’s implementation.
(define VCi::bool
(let ((pi::bool Si-precondition)
(qi::bool Si-postcondition))
(and pi (implies qi VCi+1 ))))
VC =
i=N∧
i=1
VCi
The approach for verifying privacy breaches in SNS presented in Section 3
permits users to compare two policies, an old and a new policy, for compliance.
The new policy can stipulate that the user may share content with a list of users
that is known to be a subset of the list of users specified by the old policy. The
relation among social-networking variables (the lists) is therefore represented as
a subset property over sets. This Yices subset property is combined (conjoined)
with the VCs obtained for the translation of the policies and is then passed to
the Yices solver. If the VCs and the Yices subset property are satisfiable then
no privacy breach is produced.
During the process of verification of privacy breaches, the Yices solver gener-
ates a poststate of the privacy policy (the Si-postcondition expression). Then,
we check whether the poststate privileges granted by the new policy is a subset
of the poststate privileges granted by the old policy. More concretely, we check
whether the access permissions after the execution of the new policy are a subset
of the access permissions after the execution of the old policy. If this is the case,
the new policy complies with the old policy.
6.1 A Verification Example in Yices
This section shows how privacy breaches are detected in Yices for the example
presented in Section 3.1. We verify in Yices whether CommentPolicy complies
with OriginalPolicy or not. The Yices code excerpt below is for Comment-
Policy. Parameters of all the operations occurring within the policy are created
at the beginning of the excerpt. A state is created for each operation, as well as an
initial empty state and three VC boolean variables. All these VCs are asserted,
and the satisfiability of the model is checked at the end of the code excerpt. Yices
produces a valuation that makes the Yices model satisfiable, which indicates that
all the operations contained within CommentPolicy can be executed one after
the other.
(define c1::int)
(define ow2::int)
(define cmt::int)
(define work::int)
(define s0::state emptystate)
(define s1::state)
(define s2::state)
(define s3::state)
(define VC1::bool)
(define VC2::bool)
(define VC3::bool)
;;;
(define p1::bool (create-account-precondition s0 c1 ow2))
(define q1::bool (= s1 (create-account s0 c1 ow2)))
(assert (= VC1 (and p1 (=> p1 VC2))))
;;;
(define p2::bool (create-list-precondition s1 work ow2))
(define q2::bool (= s2 (create-list s1 work ow2)))
(assert (= VC2 (and p2 (=> p2 VC3))))
;;;
(define coworkers::bset (brel-apply-to-elm (listpe s2) work))
(define p3::bool (comment-precondition s2 c1 cmt coworkers))
(define q3::bool (= s3 (comment s2 c1 cmt coworkers)))
(assert (= VC3 (and p3 (=> p3 q3))))
;;;
(assert (and VC1 VC2 VC3))
(check)
(show-model)
A second code excerpt is written for OriginalPolicy (not shown here) for
which one should verify that all the operations in the policy can be executed too.
Finally, one checks whether the NewPolicy complies with the OriginalPolicy
through an (assert (bset-is-subset coworkers best-friends)) instruction.
7 Verifying Non-Interference
This section discusses a security model for the Event-B model for social network-
ing introduced in Section 4. According to Event-B semantics, guards of two or
more events can be evaluated concurrently, whereas only one event can execute
(its actions, its critical section) at any given time. That is, events are atomic.
However, in our logical model of SNS, a user might change the content or the
content permissions of other users. For instance, a user may upload some content
to their page, hence he becomes the owner of the content, and therefore he is
granted view and edit permissions over that content. Thenceforth, the user can
transmit (publish) that content to some other user’s page, who will be granted
view permission over the content. If the first user, the content owner, deletes the
content from their page, it will also be from the page of the second user along
with all the permissions associated to that content.
This section addresses the problem of the verification of the permission flow
of “content owned” by users. Hence, we formulate here an appropriate security
policy and discuss an example on how the proposed security policy can be veri-
fied. Our security policy builds on the non-interference principle introduced by
Messenger et al. in [GM82]. Therefore, we verify that the set of permissions a
user observe on their owned content after executing a sequence of operations
(events) w is the same as the set of permissions they observe when the sequence
is interleaved with operations executed by other users.
We formulate the security policy for a social network user u. We define [[w]]u
as the output u observes after the execution of the sequence of operations w.
Observations are composed of two components, the view permissions (denoted
[[w]]vu) and the edit permissions (denoted [[w]]
d
u) a user u observes on content
owned by u. Each observation is a pair (c, p) of a set of contents (owned by u)
and a set of persons p having edit or view permission over the content. Each of
the above-mentioned components is thus a relation (in the mathematical sense)
between contents and persons. The definition of [[w]]u follows, where ⊕ represents
some appropriate set operation, union or difference, that depends on the nature
of operation e. Symbol “·” stands for the concatenation of sequences.
[[w]]u =
{
〈[[e]]vu ⊕ [[x]]
v
u, [[e]]
d
u ⊕ [[x]]
d
u〉 if w = e · x
〈,〉 if w = null
We give in what follows the definition of [[e]]u = 〈[[e]]
v
u, [[e]]
d
u〉 based on the
nature of the operation e. If the operation e is about creating a new user account,
then the creator is granted view and edit permissions over the initial (page)
content c. This operation affects u’s observation only when u is the creator:
[[create-account(p, c) · x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu ∪ {(c, u)}, [[x]]
d
u ∪ {(c, u)}〉 if p = u,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
Only the person that uploads a fresh content can observe edit and view
permissions over it:
[[upload(c, p) · x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu ∪ {(c, u)}, [[x]]
d
u ∪ {(c, u)}〉 if p = u,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
When a person p hides a content c, p’s permissions over that content are
removed. Operation hide requires person p not to be the owner of content c,
otherwise, hide would need to remove view and edit permissions to any other
user having access to that content.
[[hide(c, p) · x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu\{(c, p)}, [[x]]
d
u\{(c, p)}〉 if owner(c) , p ∧ p = u,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
The make-visible operation does not affect any permissions: it requires the
user to have view permission on the content, and, if so, it adds the content to
the user’s page content.
[[make-visible(c) · x]]u = 〈[[x]]
v
u, [[x]]
d
u〉
Person u observes a new view permission over content c for some set of
persons prs to whom user u is transmitting. User u owns content c, meaning u
has view and edit permissions over c. Only view (and not edit) permissions are
transmitted to other users.
[[transmit(c, prs) · x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu ∪ ({c} × prs), [[x]]
d
u〉
if owner(c) = u ∧ u < prs,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉
otherwise
Transmitting to a list l of users is similar to the previous operation. User u
only observes changes when he owns both the content and the list, where listow
returns the owner of a list and listpe returns the persons that are part of a
particular list.
[[transmit-to-list(c, prs, l) · x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu ∪ ({c} × prs), [[x]]
d
u〉
if u < prs∧
owner(c) = u ∧
listow(l) = u ∧ prs = listpe(l)
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉
otherwise
Restricted transmission to a list of persons l2 is similar to the transmission to
the list of persons l1, but only the restricted set of persons l1 observe the change
in the view permissions:
[[transmit-to-list-restricted(c, prs, l1, l2)·x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu ∪ ({c} × prs), [[x]]
d
u〉
if u < prs ∧
owner(c) = u ∧
listow(l1) = u ∧ prs = listpe(l1)
prs = listpe(l1) \ listpe(l2),
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉
otherwise
When user u deletes a content c and a set of contents cts, he observes there
is no longer view or edit permissions over those contents for every person that
had them. We use the relational domain subtraction operation ⊳− of Event-B (see
Table 4 in Section 5) to represent deleting from u’s observations those permis-
sions.
[[delete(c, cts) · x]]u =


〈({c} ∪ cts) ⊳− [[x]]vu, ({c} ∪ cts) ⊳− [[x]]
d
u〉 if owner(c) = u,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
Posting a comment of a content c that is to be seen by a set of persons
prs changes u’s observations when u is the owner of c. The change amounts to
observing new view and edit permissions over the comment for each person in
the set prs and also for u:
[[comment(c, cmt, prs)·x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu ∪ ({cmt} × (prs ∪ {u})),
[[x]]du ∪ ({cmt} × (prs ∪ {u}))〉 if owner(c) = u ∨
owner(cmt) ∈ prs
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
When a content c owned by u is edited by changing it into some fresh content
newc, u observes deletion of all permissions people had over c and addition of
those same permissions over newc. The set of persons that had view permission
over c is computed by using the relational evaluation [[x]]vu[{c}]. Only u, the
owner of content c, is given edit permission over content newc, and since he has
view permission over that content too, he becomes its owner.
[[edit-owned(c,newc)·x]]u =


〈({c} ⊳− [[x]]vu) ∪ ({newc} × [[x]]
v
u[{c}]),
({c} ⊳− [[x]]du) ∪ {(newc, u)}〉 if owner(c) = u,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
When user p edits a content c owned by u , p, what u observes is that p and,
in general, any other user with that page content, looses permissions over c and
gains them over the new content newc. Editing a non-owned content c works out
by using newc to replace for c everywhere except in u’s page. User p becomes
the owner of newc, hence gaining view and edit permission over it. User u does
not gain or loose any permission.
[[edit-not-owned(c,newc, p)·x]]u =


〈([[x]]vu\{(c, p)}) ∪ {(newc, p)},
([[x]]du\{(c, p)}) ∪ {(newc, p)}〉 if owner(c) = u ∧
p , u ∧
(c, p) ∈ editp,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
When u grants p view permissions over some contents c, he observes the
addition of that permission, and similarly for edit permission:
[[grant-view-permission(c, p)·x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu ∪ {(c, p)}, [[x]]
d
u〉 if owner(c) = u ∧ p , u,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
[[grant-edit-permission(c, p)·x]]u =


〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u ∪ {(c, p)}〉 if owner(c) = u ∧ p , u,
〈[[x]]vu, [[x]]
d
u〉 otherwise
7.1 Non-Interference and Purging Operations
We now define the operator [[Pt(w)]]u that returns a sequence of operations
obtained after Purging from the sequence of operations w all the operations that
user t owns. Therefore, user t does not interfere with the observation performed
by u if and only if [[Pt (w)]]u is equal to [[w]]u.
Pt (create-account(p, c) · x) =
{
x if p = t,
w otherwise
Pt (upload(c, p) · x) =
{
x if p = t,
w otherwise
Pt (hide(c, p) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t,
w otherwise
Pt (make-visible(c) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t,
w otherwise
Pt (transmit(c, prs) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t,
w otherwise
Pt (transmit-to-list(c, prs, l) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t,
w otherwise
Pt (transmit-to-list-restricted(c, prs, l1, l2) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t,
w otherwise
Pt (delete(c, cts) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t,
w otherwise
Pt (comment(c, cmt, prs) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t ∨ t ∈ prs,
w otherwise
Pt (edit-owned(c,newc) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t,
w otherwise
Pt (edit-not-owned(c,newc, p) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) , t,
w otherwise
Pt (grant-view-permission(c, p) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t ∧ p , t,
w otherwise
Pt (grant-edit-permission(c, p) · x) =
{
x if owner(c) = t ∧ p , t,
w otherwise
7.2 A Security Verification Example
As an example of how one can prove the satisfaction of the security policy we
present the following case. Let us assume the following operations within the
SNS. A user a first uploads some content ca to the network. Therefore, a becomes
the owner of ca. Next, user a transmits ca to user b. User b then comments on
content ca. We must, therefore, prove that the action performed by user b has
no effect on the privileges (permissions) that user a has over their content ca.
The initial sequence of operations observed by a is the following:
[[w]]a = 〈,〉
The first operation, e0, to occur is upload. As per the definition above,
[[upload(a, ca) · x]]a = 〈[[x]]
v
a ∪ {(ca, a)}, [[x]]
d
a ∪ {(ca, a)}〉
where sequence x0 = upload.x, and owner(ca) = a.
The second operation to occur, e1, is transmit. As per the definition above,
[[transmit(ca, prs) · x0]]a = 〈[[x0]]
v
u ∪ ({ca} × prs), [[x0]]
d
a ∪ {(ca, a)}〉
where sequence x1 = transmit.x0, under the assumption b , a ∧ b ∈ prs ∧ a <
prs
The third operation to occur, e2, is comment. User b comments on content
item ca, which a owns. The comment cmt is owned by b. And, b belongs to the
list prs of receivers as for the previous assumption. As per the definition above,
[[comment(ca, cmt, prs)·x1]]a = 〈[[x0]]
v
u∪({ca}×prs)∪({cmt}×(prs∪{u})), [[x0]]
d
a∪{(ca, a)}∪({cmt}×(prs∪{u}))〉
where sequence x2 = comment.x1, under the assumption owner(cmt) = b.
Then, we take sequence x2 and purge the operations that b owns, that is, we
purge the operations performed by b. In our example the action to be purged is
commenting on content ca, that is, operation e2. As per the definition above,
Pb(x2) = Pb(comment(ca, cmt, prs) · x1) = x1
as per the assumption b ∈ prs
[[Pb(x2)]]a = [[x1]]a = [[upload(a, ca) · x]]a = 〈[[x]]
v
a ∪ {(ca, a)}, [[x]]
d
a ∪ {(ca, a)}〉
[[x2]]a = 〈[[x0]]
v
u∪({ca}×prs)∪({cmt}×(prs∪{u})), [[x0]]
d
a∪{(ca, a)}∪({cmt}×(prs∪{u}))〉
[[Pb(x2)]]a , [[x2]]a
and therefore user b interferes with user a.
Notice that one needs to check that each operation in x2 is executable (fol-
lowing Section 6) before checking for non-interference. Also notice that small
changes in the definition of the SNS operations may produce different results for
the verification of non-interference. The definition of operation comment allows
anyone in prs to comment on content c. List prs may be the list of best-friends
of owner(c), or any other list of receivers. Every and each member of prs is given
edit permission over cmt. That is, not only the owner of the comment but also
owner(c) and any other member of prs can delete cmt. This modeled behavior
does not match the behavior of a SNS like Facebook in which only the owner of
the comment can delete it or edit it. In the definition of purging a comment, we
could have opted for having only owner(c) to be the owner of the operation and
not any of the members of prs. This would have made the user b not to interfere
with the user a.
8 Related Work
IBM’s Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [BBKS03] and the
OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [Mos05] are defi-
nition languages for privacy policies. They define rules that specify the condition
under which an entity can be granted access to some data. These conditions are
specified over a specific attribute using functions over values. The rules and
conditions must also contain a description of which rule or policy applies to a
specific request. This format of policy specification raises problems in the con-
text of SNS as it is too restrictive, requiring the specification of rules relating
each user to each content and they do not provide the flexibility for specifying
multiple generalizable policies.
In [Dan09], George Danezis proposes the definition of a framework for privacy
policies inference based on the user’s social context. The framework uses an
approach based on graph theory and machine learning that draws context from
previous actions performed within the social network. It aims to infer what a
user’s policy might be based on the context of its actions. This form of inferring
privacy policies was found to be easy for users as it automates the process of
publishing content. However, it leaves the user exposed to privacy breaches as
he has less control over who his content is accessible to.
In [DDLS01], the authors present a privacy policy definition mechanism based
on role based access control called RBAC [FSG+01]. In such a mechanism various
users are designated to serve specific roles within the system. Privileges over
content are granted to a user based on their role. Content in turn must carry
with it a privacy policy defining access criteria, that is, what roles a user might
be granted access content. Such a mechanism is found to be too restrictive for
social network privacy policies as users don’t usually adopt specific roles, rather
roles are in a constant state of change, with users sharing or hiding content as
they choose. Additionally, the approach presented in [DDLS01], requires certain
users to adopt a managerial role to oversee content sharing. Our policy definitions
do not require this level of user commitment and have the flexibility to define
policies as and when a user chooses.
In [BCCB+07], Julien Brunel et. al., incorporate the above approaches in
defining a formal policy specification language and contextual awareness for
policy definition. They define access control as a set of rules allowing a user
to gain access through the Information System. The policy is dependent on
the subject performing the action and on what they are accessing. Contextual
permissions depend on the system environment at the time of the action, that is,
their framework associates the access-privilege conditions that must be satisfied
according to the system state. The mechanisms for user access control and policy
generation based on context are designed for information systems wherein access
to content is granted based on rules defined within the system. These rules are
defined based on criteria such a user’s clearance level. Based on these rules when
a user attempts to access some content item the rules associated with the content
are checked and if satisfied the system will allow the access. This differs from
social networks as the user is not attempting to access some content, rather a
set of content is shared with them. Therefore based on the rules/ privacy policy
content is shared with some users. The difference in the approach presented
by the authors and our approach is in their application. Julien Brunel et. al.
apply policy definition within information systems wherein all the context is self-
contained. Within online social networks a lot of context might not be contained
within the system but rather in the offline world.
In [SHC+09,SG04] Norman Sadeh et. al. present several frameworks to deal
with privacy concerns when using location aware services. These frameworks
rely on various anonymization techniques. These techniques have shown great
success in location-based social networking services. But as they primarily rely
on altering the content the user is sharing, they are not suitable as a generalized
approach towards policy definition.
The Mobius PCC (Proof Carrying Code) infrastructure [BCG+07] draws
heavily from the foundational PCC [App01] approach, so it avoids any com-
mitment to a particular type system and the use of a verification condition (VC)
generator. In foundational PCC, the code provider must give both the executable
code plus a proof in the foundational logic that the code satisfies the consumer’s
safety policy. Foundation proof carrying code generates VCs directly from the
operational semantics so making the proofs more complicated to produce. We
target social network applications and generate VCs, based on WP calculus, in
a similar way as they are generated in foundational PCC.
Lissom is a source level PCC platform [GMdSP06] that outputs VCs into
the Why toolset [CM09] and the Coq proof assistant [INR06]. We generate VCs
directly from source code too, and initially considered Why to discharge VCs,
but then opted for the Yices prover.
P3P, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (http://www.w3.org/P3P/), an
effort of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), encompasses a standard XML
mark-up language for expressing privacy policies so as to enable user agent tools
(e.g. Web browsers, electronic wallets, mobile phones, stand-alone applications,
or social network applications) to read them and take appropriate actions. A P3P
Policy is primarily a set of boolean answers to multiple-choice questions about
name and contact information, the kind of access that is provided, the kind of
data collected, the way the collected data will be used, and whether the data will
be shared with third parties or not. Though P3P policies are precisely scoped
[CL02], they are not expressive enough to model general privacy properties on
content. They are not based on mathematical formalisms either, e.g., predicate
calculus, so that it is not possible to reason about the truths derivable from
policies expressed in P3P standard language.
In [BSS08], N. Sadeh et al. develop a theory that relates expressiveness and
efficiency in a domain-independent manner. Authors derive an upper bound on
the expected efficiency of a given mechanism. The expected efficiency depends
on the mechanism’s expressiveness only. Using predicate calculus to write users’
privacy policies on content improves the expressiveness of mechanisms modeling
policies. We plan to build on Sadeh et al.’s work to study how this higher ex-
pressiveness of predicate calculus based privacy policies comes down to a higher
efficiency of the agent mechanisms allowing social-network users to set their
privacy preferences.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
With the ever-growing complexity of social network relationships and the way
social networking sites link and share content, mechanisms to identify potential
privacy and security breaches are crucial. Privacy breaches due to transitivity
permission-delegation threats can very often be unintentional. Providing social
network users with feedback on the consequences of their actions can help mit-
igate such transitivity based privacy breaches. This paper presents a formal
methods framework for dealing with privacy threats in SNS. We model the be-
havior of SNS in Logic and use the Rodin platform to sanitize our model by
checking the adherence of the SN operations against the safety properties of the
model. By performing this checking in Rodin we avoid having to perform a sim-
ilar checking in Yices, which ultimately will negatively affect our future work,
which is described below.
As future work, we plan to extend our verification framework for use in
Facebook. The extension can be implemented over two axis. Over a first axis,
the checking of privacy breaches can be implemented as a Facebook plug-in that
performs the verification on-the-fly each time (before) a user wants to update
his privacy settings. The plug-in would inform the user whether any violation
is produced. Over a second axis, a (second) plug-in would inform a user if a
new feature, game, or an additional functionality would break his privacy policy.
This plug-in can be implemented using Proof-Carrying-Code (PCC) techniques
[Nec97]. PCC is a mechanism to check if a host system (the code consumer) can
safely execute a third-party application (produced by the code producer) so that
it does not violate a safety policy that constitutes a well-definedness property of
the host system. With PCC, the code producer is required to provide the third-
party application (the Facebook plug-in) and a safety proof (a certificate) that
attests to the safety property. The code consumer (the Facebook user account)
validates the proof by running it and hence checking if it can safely run the
third-party application. The safety policy is composed of two parts, a set of
safety rules and an interface. The safety rules are a set of operations (made
available by the host system) and its preconditions. The interface is a set of
invariants that the third-party application must establish before calling any of
the operations provided by the host system. As for our work, the safety rules
are the operations presented in Section 5.2, and the interface is formed of the
invariant properties presented at the beginning of Section 4. In short, we believe
that our work might lead to the development of new back-end systems that can
help users understand their decisions.
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